fix(security): block cli_scope escalation and cross-group data leaks

Group-scoped agents could previously:
- See all agent groups via `groups list` (generic list skips --id filter)
- Look up any session by UUID via `sessions get`
- Request cli_scope change to global via config update approval

Fixed by:
- Post-handler filtering: list results filtered, get results verified
  against caller's agent_group_id
- Pre-handler --id check scoped to resources where id IS the group ID
  (groups, destinations) so session UUIDs aren't falsely rejected
- cli_scope/cli-scope args blocked outright for group-scoped agents,
  before the approval gate

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
gavrielc
2026-05-09 20:17:13 +03:00
parent 04e41fb0ef
commit faeeba198e
2 changed files with 139 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@@ -55,12 +55,21 @@ export async function dispatch(req: RequestFrame, ctx: CallerContext): Promise<R
// Enforce group scope on all agent-group-related args.
// Different resources use different arg names for the agent group ID.
const groupArgs = ['id', 'agent_group_id', 'group'] as const;
// Only check --id for resources where it IS the agent group ID.
const groupArgs = ['agent_group_id', 'group'] as const;
for (const key of groupArgs) {
if (req.args[key] && req.args[key] !== ctx.agentGroupId) {
return err(req.id, 'forbidden', 'CLI access is scoped to this agent group.');
}
}
if ((cmd.resource === 'groups' || cmd.resource === 'destinations') && req.args.id && req.args.id !== ctx.agentGroupId) {
return err(req.id, 'forbidden', 'CLI access is scoped to this agent group.');
}
// Block cli_scope changes from group-scoped agents (privilege escalation)
if (req.args.cli_scope !== undefined || req.args['cli-scope'] !== undefined) {
return err(req.id, 'forbidden', 'Cannot change cli_scope from a group-scoped agent.');
}
// Auto-fill agent-group-related args so the agent doesn't need
// to pass its own group ID explicitly.
@@ -109,7 +118,28 @@ export async function dispatch(req: RequestFrame, ctx: CallerContext): Promise<R
}
try {
const data = await cmd.handler(parsed, ctx);
let data = await cmd.handler(parsed, ctx);
// Post-handler group scope enforcement: filter/verify results belong
// to the caller's agent group. Catches leaks that pre-handler auto-fill
// can't prevent (e.g. `groups list` where the id arg is skipped by the
// generic list handler, or `sessions get` by UUID).
if (ctx.caller === 'agent' && cmd.resource) {
const configRow = getContainerConfig(ctx.agentGroupId);
if ((configRow?.cli_scope ?? 'group') === 'group') {
const groupField = cmd.resource === 'groups' ? 'id' : 'agent_group_id';
if (Array.isArray(data)) {
data = data.filter(
(row) => typeof row === 'object' && row !== null && (row as Record<string, unknown>)[groupField] === ctx.agentGroupId,
);
} else if (data && typeof data === 'object' && groupField in (data as Record<string, unknown>)) {
if ((data as Record<string, unknown>)[groupField] !== ctx.agentGroupId) {
return err(req.id, 'forbidden', 'Resource belongs to a different agent group.');
}
}
}
}
return { id: req.id, ok: true, data };
} catch (e) {
return err(req.id, 'handler-error', errMsg(e));