The SessionStart nudge built a statusLine command by interpolating the
plugin's __dirname path into a double-quoted shell string. A clone path
containing shell metacharacters (quotes, &, $, backtick, ;) could break
out when the suggested command later runs via the statusline shell.
Low severity in practice: the path is the install location, so triggering
it requires installing into a maliciously-named directory, i.e. the
attacker already controls the filesystem. Hardening it anyway.
Gate the snippet behind isShellSafe() (allowlist of ordinary path chars,
allowing : \ / for normal Windows and POSIX paths). Unsafe paths fall
back to a manual-setup instruction instead of an embeddable command. An
allowlist beats a per-shell escaper, which is its own edge-case bug farm.
Refs #200
The deactivation check matched the phrase anywhere in the prompt, so an
ordinary request like "add a normal mode toggle" silently turned ponytail
off for the rest of the session. Match the whole message instead (trimmed,
case-insensitive, trailing punctuation ignored) through a shared helper used
by both the Claude/Codex hook and the pi extension.
Fixes#161
ponytail-activate.js and ponytail-runtime.js hardcoded ~/.claude for the
flag file and settings lookup, ignoring CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR. Add a shared
getClaudeDir() to ponytail-config.js and use it in both. Regression test
added to hooks.test.js.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
DietrichGebert