fix(agent-route): reject unsafe attachment filenames to prevent path traversal

Filenames in forwardAttachedFiles arrived from the source agent's
messages_out content and were used directly in path.join on both
source outbox read and target inbox write. A value like `../evil.sh`
could escape `inbox/<a2a-id>/` on the target session (and similarly
the source outbox on read), breaking session isolation — an
adversarial or hallucinating sub-agent could overwrite files in
a sibling session.

Adds isSafeAttachmentName(name) — exported so it's unit-testable —
which rejects empty, `.`, `..`, anything containing `/`, `\`, or
NUL, and anything path.basename would strip. Guard runs before any
I/O. Unsafe names are dropped with a warning log, same pattern as
missing-source-file handling; a bad filename in one attachment
doesn't kill the whole route's text delivery.

Addresses Codex Review P1 on qwibitai/nanoclaw#1967.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

src/modules/agent-to-agent/agent-route.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+
+import { isSafeAttachmentName } from './agent-route.js';
+
+/**
+ * `forwardAttachedFiles` has a filesystem side that's awkward to unit-test
+ * without mocking DATA_DIR. The guarantee worth pinning is that the
+ * filename validator rejects everything that could escape the inbox dir —
+ * `forwardAttachedFiles` runs this guard before any I/O, so traversal is
+ * impossible as long as this matrix holds.
+ */
+describe('isSafeAttachmentName', () => {
+  it('accepts plain filenames', () => {
+    expect(isSafeAttachmentName('baby-duck.png')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSafeAttachmentName('file with spaces.pdf')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSafeAttachmentName('report.v2.docx')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSafeAttachmentName('.hidden')).toBe(true); // leading dot is fine, just not `.` / `..`
+  });
+
+  it('rejects empty / sentinel values', () => {
+    expect(isSafeAttachmentName('')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isSafeAttachmentName('.')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isSafeAttachmentName('..')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects path separators', () => {
+    expect(isSafeAttachmentName('../evil.png')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isSafeAttachmentName('/etc/passwd')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isSafeAttachmentName('nested/file.txt')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isSafeAttachmentName('windows\\path.exe')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects NUL bytes', () => {
+    expect(isSafeAttachmentName('clean\0.png')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects anything path.basename would strip', () => {
+    expect(isSafeAttachmentName('a/b')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isSafeAttachmentName('./thing')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects non-string input', () => {
+    expect(isSafeAttachmentName(null as unknown as string)).toBe(false);
+    expect(isSafeAttachmentName(undefined as unknown as string)).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

src/modules/agent-to-agent/agent-route.ts

@@ -36,6 +36,26 @@ export interface ForwardedAttachment {
   localPath: string;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Is `name` safe to use as the last segment of a path inside the target
+ * agent's inbox directory? Filenames arrive in messages_out content from
+ * the source agent — under a multi-agent setup with heterogenous providers
+ * (or a compromised / hallucinating sub-agent) they can't be trusted.
+ *
+ * Rejects:
+ *   - empty string
+ *   - `.` / `..` (traversal sentinels that path.basename returns as-is)
+ *   - anything containing a path separator (`/` or `\`) or NUL
+ *   - any value where `path.basename(name) !== name`, catching OS-specific
+ *     separators and covering drives/prefixes on Windows runtimes
+ */
+export function isSafeAttachmentName(name: string): boolean {
+  if (typeof name !== 'string' || name.length === 0) return false;
+  if (name === '.' || name === '..') return false;
+  if (/[\\/\0]/.test(name)) return false;
+  return path.basename(name) === name;
+}
+
 /**
  * Copy file attachments from the source agent's outbox into the target
  * agent's inbox. Returns attachments using the formatter's existing
@@ -43,9 +63,9 @@ export interface ForwardedAttachment {
  * as relative to `/workspace/`, matching how channel-inbound attachments
  * are surfaced today.
  *
- * Missing source files are skipped with a warning rather than failing
- * the whole route — a bad filename reference shouldn't kill the
- * accompanying text.
+ * Missing source files and unsafe (path-traversal) filenames are skipped
+ * with a warning rather than failing the whole route — a bad filename
+ * reference shouldn't kill the accompanying text.
  */
 export function forwardAttachedFiles(
   source: { agentGroupId: string; sessionId: string; messageId: string; filenames: string[] },
@@ -67,6 +87,13 @@ export function forwardAttachedFiles(
 
   const attachments: ForwardedAttachment[] = [];
   for (const filename of source.filenames) {
+    if (!isSafeAttachmentName(filename)) {
+      log.warn('agent-route: rejecting unsafe attachment filename (path traversal attempt?)', {
+        sourceMsgId: source.messageId,
+        filename,
+      });
+      continue;
+    }
     const src = path.join(sourceDir, filename);
     if (!fs.existsSync(src)) {
       log.warn('agent-route: referenced file missing in source outbox, skipped', {