- wakeContainer now never throws — returns Promise<boolean>, catches
internally. Closes the regression risk for the 5 awaited callers in
agent-to-agent, interactive, and approvals/response-handler that the
previous version left unwrapped. Router uses the boolean to stop the
typing indicator on transient failure; host-sweep just awaits.
- Tighten AUTH_REQUIRED_RE: anchor to start-of-string with the specific
`·` (U+00B7) separator the CLI uses, so an agent that quotes the
banner mid-sentence in a normal reply doesn't trip the classifier.
- Log a one-line note from writeAuthRequiredMessage so substitutions
are visible when debugging "user got the credentials message but I
don't see why."
- Add unit tests for ClaudeProvider.isAuthRequired covering both banner
variants, trailing content, mid-sentence quoting, leading-prose
quoting, alternate separators, and unrelated text.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two related fixes for the case where credentials aren't usable:
1. Replace Claude Code's "Not logged in / Invalid API key · Please run
/login" output with a host-aware message. The user can't run /login
from chat, so the raw text is unhelpful. Provider gains an optional
isAuthRequired() classifier; the poll-loop substitutes the message
on both result-text and error paths.
2. Treat OneCLI gateway failure as a transient hard error instead of
spawning a credential-less container. The catch in container-runner
now propagates; router and host-sweep wrap wakeContainer to log and
leave the inbound row pending so the next 60s sweep tick retries.
Router also stops the typing indicator on failure.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Slipped through during the #2035 rebase resolution — both #2030's import
and ours landed in the merge. TypeScript dedups by symbol so it didn't
fail the typecheck, but it's noise and would've eventually tripped a
linter rule.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The original approach passed ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN into the container
as an env var and disabled the proxy for the custom host (NO_PROXY) —
which works, but bypasses OneCLI entirely for that credential. The
container holds the raw secret, the gateway loses audit/rotation, and
we lose the rest of the vault's protections for this cohort.
OneCLI-native version: store the token as a generic secret with header
injection (--header-name Authorization --value-format 'Bearer {value}'
+ host-pattern matching the base URL hostname). The container only
needs ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL plus a placeholder ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN — the
proxy rewrites the Authorization header on the wire.
setup/lib/setup-config.ts — adds --anthropic-auth-token alongside the
existing --anthropic-base-url.
setup/auto.ts — runAuthStep short-circuits the auth-method prompt when
both NANOCLAW_ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL and NANOCLAW_ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN are
set: creates the OneCLI generic secret, writes ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL to
.env (so the runtime reads it), and appends `import './claude.js';` to
src/providers/index.ts (so the provider only registers when the user
has configured a custom endpoint — no branching for everyone else).
src/providers/claude.ts — drops ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN/NO_PROXY
passthrough. Reads ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL from .env, sets a placeholder
ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN in container env so the SDK includes an
Authorization header for OneCLI to overwrite.
src/providers/index.ts — removes the unconditional import; setup
appends it on demand.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Users with a custom Anthropic-compatible endpoint (ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL) were
getting 401s because the OneCLI proxy injects ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=placeholder
and forwards to api.anthropic.com, overriding the custom endpoint and key.
Add a claude provider host config that reads ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL,
ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN, and CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC from .env
and passes them into the container. Also sets NO_PROXY for the custom host so
the OneCLI proxy doesn't intercept those requests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Matches the OneCLI CLI's own format expectation ("oc_... format" per
`onecli auth login --help`) so a malformed token gets caught at setup
time rather than at first vault call.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaces the example.internal placeholder with the hosted gateway URL
so the advanced screen and --help suggest the canonical destination
out of the box.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Without `onecli auth login`, setup-time CLI calls (e.g. `secrets list`
inside anthropicSecretExists, `secrets create` in runPasteAuth) hit a
secured remote vault unauthenticated and fail silently — the auth step
sees no existing Anthropic credential and prompts the user to add one
even when it's already in the remote vault.
Two auth surfaces matter here: the CLI's persistent store via
`onecli auth login --api-key`, and ONECLI_API_KEY in .env that the
runtime SDK reads at request time. We need both.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a single config registry that drives both CLI flags and an opt-in
advanced-settings screen, so power users can override defaults like
remote OneCLI host/token or alt Anthropic endpoints without burdening
the standard linear flow with extra prompts.
Why: advanced configurations didn't fit cleanly into the existing
sequenced setup. PR #2030 took the "add another prompt step" route for
remote OneCLI; this approach instead routes those overrides through a
single source of truth so adding the next knob (alt endpoint, custom
host pattern, …) doesn't mean another prompt-or-skip decision.
setup/lib/setup-config.ts — schema (typed entry list with surface
'flag' | 'flag+ui'), name derivation (camelCase → NANOCLAW_UPPER_SNAKE
+ --kebab-case), seeded with --onecli-api-host, --onecli-api-token,
--anthropic-base-url, plus existing NANOCLAW_SKIP / NANOCLAW_DISPLAY_NAME
as flag-only entries.
setup/lib/setup-config-parse.ts — argv parser (--key value, --key=value,
--no-bool, -- terminator), env reader, applyToEnv() bridge that writes
resolved values back to process.env so existing step code keeps reading
env vars unchanged. Also --help printer.
setup/lib/setup-config-screen.ts — interactive menu loop. Entries
render with current value as hint; selecting one opens the right prompt
type (text / password for secrets / confirm / brightSelect for enums);
"Done" returns to the main flow.
setup/auto.ts — parses argv first (--help short-circuits before any
render), folds env+flags into process.env, then offers a welcome menu:
"Standard setup" (default) vs "Advanced". The onecli step branches on
NANOCLAW_ONECLI_API_HOST: if set, skips the local-vs-fresh prompt
entirely, runs pollHealth pre-flight, then calls runQuietStep with
--remote-url. Token, when provided, writes through to ONECLI_API_KEY in
.env. Welcome copy tightened (drops the duplicate wordmark/tagline) so
the bash → clack handoff reads as one flow.
setup/onecli.ts — cherries the --remote-url implementation from PR
run()) and generalizes writeEnvOnecliUrl into a writeEnvVar helper so
ONECLI_API_KEY follows the same upsert path.
nanoclaw.sh — forwards "$@" to setup:auto so flags reach the parser;
trims the redundant "Setting up your personal AI assistant" subtitle
and the bootstrap teach line so the pre-clack section isn't competing
with the clack intro for the same role.
Token plumbing only fires in --remote-url mode; local installs are
unauthenticated against localhost and don't need it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Allow connecting to an OneCLI gateway running on another host instead
of installing one locally. Adds a third choice ('Connect to a remote
OneCLI') alongside reuse/fresh in the setup wizard, prompts for the
remote URL, validates reachability before proceeding, and passes
--remote-url to the onecli step.
In onecli.ts: extracts installOnecliCliOnly() for the remote path
(installs the CLI binary but skips the gateway), exports pollHealth
for use by auto.ts, and handles --remote-url to configure api-host
and write ONECLI_URL to .env without running the full gateway install.
Absorbs battle-tested knowledge from the v2 skill into the upstream
add-signal: registration paths (new number + linked device), CAPTCHA
flow, VoIP SMS-first timing, Java prereq, config-lock warning, wiring
SQL for groups, not_member silent-drop fix, GroupV2 groupId extraction
note, and UUID-based platform ID format.
Corrects a factual error in the upstream: DM platform IDs are
signal:{UUID} (ACI), not phone numbers.
Removes the now-redundant add-signal-v2 skill.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
setup/register.ts had two bugs that prevented new channels from being
registered via `/manage-channels`:
1. createMessagingGroupAgent was called with the legacy field names
`trigger_rules` and `response_scope`. The SQL INSERT expects
`engage_mode` / `engage_pattern` / `sender_scope` / `ignored_message_policy`
(migration 010). Every register call failed with
`RangeError: Missing named parameter "engage_mode"` after the agent
and messaging group were partially created — leaving an orphaned pair.
Now mirrors scripts/init-first-agent.ts:wireIfMissing:
- Groups (is_group=1) default to engage_mode='mention' (bot only
responds when addressed).
- DMs (is_group=0) default to engage_mode='pattern' with '.' (respond
to every message).
- An explicit --trigger overrides the pattern regex.
2. The "normalize platform_id" block unconditionally prefixed
"<channel>:" even for native IDs like WhatsApp JIDs
("120363408974444974@g.us"), iMessage emails ("user@example.com"),
or Signal phones ("+15551234567") / Signal groups ("group:abc"). But
the router (src/router.ts:158) looks up messaging_groups by the raw
event.platformId from the adapter, which for these native adapters
never has a prefix. So the prefixed row was never matched — the
message was silently dropped with no "Message routed" log.
Extracted scripts/init-first-agent.ts:namespacedPlatformId into
src/platform-id.ts so both setup paths use the same heuristic (skip
the prefix for IDs containing '@', starting with '+', or starting
with 'group:'). Prevents future drift between the two paths.
Tested by: re-running `setup/index.ts --step register` for a WhatsApp
group JID, confirming the row is created with correct engage fields
and matching platform_id, then sending a test message and observing
"Message routed" with the right agent group.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds /add-gcal-tool — a sibling of /add-gmail-tool that installs
@cocal/google-calendar-mcp with the same OneCLI stub-file pattern. Skill
applies the Dockerfile + TOOL_ALLOWLIST changes at install time; trunk
stays clean so users who never run the skill don't carry the calendar
MCP in their image.
Dropped the Phase 5 dry-run section since it hardcoded a per-install
image tag slug and duplicated Phase 4's live agent test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The upstream precedence fix (5845a5a) made agent_groups.agent_provider and
sessions.agent_provider authoritative for host-side provider contribution
(per-session mount, env passthrough), but those DB values don't propagate
into the group's container.json — and the in-container runner reads
`provider` from container.json, not from the DB. That caused a confusing
failure mode: flipping the DB column to 'codex', rebuilding, and
restarting still spawned a Claude runner because container.json had no
provider field. The old skill wording ("container receives AGENT_PROVIDER
from the resolved value") overstated the integration.
Update add-codex and add-opencode "Per group / per session" sections to
say: set `"provider": "<name>"` in the group's container.json — that's
the source the runner reads. Keep the DB columns documented for the
host-side contribution they actually drive, and spell out the
session → group → container.json → 'claude' fallback so the precedence
is still discoverable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 2 of the SKILL.md already contains the Dockerfile + TOOL_ALLOWLIST
edit instructions with an "ALREADY APPLIED" short-circuit. Keeping those
edits out of trunk means users who never run /add-gmail-tool don't carry
the Gmail MCP package in their image.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
On a fork PR, GITHUB_TOKEN is demoted to read-only regardless of the
workflow's permissions: block, so issues.addLabels() returns 403. The
label workflow silently works for PRs that skip the template (no
checkboxes ticked → no API call) and fails for PRs that actually
follow it — a hostile incentive against contributors who do the right
thing.
pull_request_target runs in the context of the base branch with full
declared permissions, which is the documented fix for this case. Safe
here because the workflow is metadata-only: it reads
context.payload.pull_request.body and calls addLabels. No checkout,
no PR-supplied code executes. A SECURITY comment is added above the
trigger to keep it that way.
Refs:
- https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/events-that-trigger-workflows#pull_request_target
- https://securitylab.github.com/resources/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two long-line violations introduced in d121cd1 (isGroup plumbing)
exceed the printWidth limit. CI format:check fails on every PR
opened against main until this is fixed; the fix is isolated here
so no behavior change is mixed in.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Filenames in forwardAttachedFiles arrived from the source agent's
messages_out content and were used directly in path.join on both
source outbox read and target inbox write. A value like `../evil.sh`
could escape `inbox/<a2a-id>/` on the target session (and similarly
the source outbox on read), breaking session isolation — an
adversarial or hallucinating sub-agent could overwrite files in
a sibling session.
Adds isSafeAttachmentName(name) — exported so it's unit-testable —
which rejects empty, `.`, `..`, anything containing `/`, `\`, or
NUL, and anything path.basename would strip. Guard runs before any
I/O. Unsafe names are dropped with a warning log, same pattern as
missing-source-file handling; a bad filename in one attachment
doesn't kill the whole route's text delivery.
Addresses Codex Review P1 on qwibitai/nanoclaw#1967.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Before: `send_file(to='parent')` from a sub-agent wrote the bytes to
the sub-agent's own session outbox, but agent-to-agent routing copied
only the content JSON — the target's inbound message referenced
`files: ['x.png']` but the bytes lived in a session directory the
target couldn't mount. Parent agents orchestrating sub-agents (e.g.
Design Team delegating illustration work to an Illustrator sub-agent
on Codex) received file-reference messages with nothing to forward.
Fix: on route, if the source's content has `files`, copy each referenced
file from `<source>/outbox/<src-msg-id>/` to
`<target>/inbox/<a2a-msg-id>/`, and emit `attachments` (the existing
formatter convention — see formatter.ts:223) with `localPath` relative
to `/workspace/`. The target formatter already renders these as
`[file: <name> — saved to /workspace/inbox/<a2a-id>/<name>]`, so the
target agent sees the path and can call `send_file(path=…, to=…)` to
forward onward.
Convention matches what session-manager.ts:256 already does for
base64-encoded channel-inbound attachments — same inbox layout, same
content shape. Nothing on the formatter/agent side needed to change.
## Scope
- `forwardAttachedFiles(source, target)` — pure-ish helper that copies
files and returns the attachments array.
- `forwardFileAttachments(msg, …)` — wraps the helper for the route
path: parses content, copies files if present, merges into any
existing `attachments`, re-serialises.
- `routeAgentMessage` — uses the rewritten content when writing the
target's inbound row.
- Log line now includes `forwardedFileCount` for observability.
Missing source files are skipped with a warning rather than killing
the route — a bad filename in a batch shouldn't drop the
accompanying text.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
